Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 54-90

  Bracht, Juergen ^a   Figuières, Charles ^b   Ratto, Marisa ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b Lameta and University of Montpellier 1   (France)

^c POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Incentive mechanisms; Public goods; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 37549041290     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005     Document Type: Article

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