Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: An experimental evaluation

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 148-172

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Phillips, Owen R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATION LEVEL; COST MITIGATION; HARVEST RATES; INDUSTRIAL COSTS; INDUSTRY SIZE; INTER-FIRM COOPERATION; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS;

EID: 0031449267     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1997.1006     Document Type: Article

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