Cooperation in the commons

Economic Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 71-88

  Polasky, Stephen ^a   Tarui, Nori ^b   Ellis, Gregory M ^c   Mason, Charles F ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

Common property resource; Cooperation; Dynamic game

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746813646     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0018-x     Document Type: Article

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