Checks, balances, and the cost of regulation: Evidence from the American States

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 696-706

  Daley, Dorothy M ^a   Haider Markel, Donald P ^a   Whitford, Andrew B ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Compliance costs; Credible commitment; Environmental regulation; Veto points

Indexed keywords

EID: 36649021761     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912907307517     Document Type: Article

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