The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 457-477

  Veiga, Linda Gonçalves ^a   Pinho, Maria Manuel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINHO   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PORTO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Grants; Intergovernmental relations; Political economy; Portugal

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648977600     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9208-3     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Akhmedov, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1301-1338.
2. Alperovich, G. (1984). The economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authorities. Public Choice, 44, 285-296.
3. Alt, J., & Lassen, D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 530-550.
4. Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2006). Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), 547-569.
5. Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297.
6. Borck, R., & Owings, S. (2003). The political economy of intergovernmental grants. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 33, 139-156.
7. Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143.
8. Bungey, M., Grossman, P., & Kenyon, P. (1991). Explaining intergovernmental grants: Australian evidence. Applied Economics, 23, 659-668.
9. Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295.
10. Case, A. (2001). Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania. European Economic Review, 45, 405-423.
11. Couch, J. F., & Shughart, W. F. (1998). The political economy of the new deal. Cheltenham, Eng., and Northampton: Edward Elgar for the Locke Institute.
12. Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. Journal of Politics, 48(2), 370-389.
13. Dahlberg, M., & Johansson, E. (2002). On the vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 27-40.
14. Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. The Journal of Politics, 58(4), 1132-1155.
15. Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1998). Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), 497-529.
16. Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2006). Pork barrel politics. NBER Working Paper Series, 12190, 1-34.
17. Feld, L. P., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2005). Voters as hard budget constraints: on the determination of intergovernmental grants. Public Choice, 123(1-2), 147-169.
18. Fishback, P. V., Kantor, S., & Wallis, J. J. (2003). Can the New Deal's three Rs be rehabilitated? A program-by-program, county-by-county analysis. Explorations in Economic History, 40(3), 278-307.
19. Gist, J. R., & Hill, R. C. (1984). Political and economic influences on bureaucratic allocation of federal funds: The cast of urban development action grants. The Journal of Urban Economics, 16, 158-172.
20. Grossman, P. J. (1994). A political theory of intergovernmental grants. Public Choice, 78, 295-303.
21. Johansson, E. (2003). Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: Empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 883-914.
22. Lindbeck, A. (1976). Stabilization policy in open economies with endogenous politicians. The American Economic Review, 66(2), 1-19.
23. Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice, 52, 273-297.
24. Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. (1993). A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy. Journal of Public Economics, 51, 195-209.
25. Lowry, R. C., & Potoski, M. (2004). Organized interests and the politics of federal discretionary grants. The Journal of Politics, 66(2), 513-533.
26. Nordhaus, W. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169-190.
27. Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII, 1120-1149.
28. Pereira, P. T. (1996). A politico-economic approach to intergovernmental lump-sum grants. Public Choice, 88, 185-201.
29. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004). Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes. American Economic Review, 94(1), 25-45.
30. Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80, 21-36.
31. Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economics Studies, 55, 1-16.
32. Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1367-1389.
33. Veiga, L., & Veiga, F. (2007). Political business cycles at the municipal level. Public Choice, 131(1-2), 45-64.
34. Wallis, J. J. (1998). The political economy of New Deal spending revisited, again: With and without Nevada. Explorations in Economic History, 35(2), 140-170.
35. Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), 25-51.
36. Worthington, A. C., & Dollery, B. E. (1998). The political determination of intergovernmental grants in Australia. Public Choice, 94(3-4), 299-315.
37. Wright, G. (1974). The political economy of New Deal spending: An econometric analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56(1), 30-38.