The political economy of intergovernmental grants

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 139-156

  Borck, Rainald ^a   Owings, Stephanie ^b  

^a KPMG AG   (Germany)

^b FORT LEWIS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Intergovernmental grants; Lobbying; Spillovers

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC SPENDING; SPILLOVER EFFECT;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0037369063     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0166-0462(02)00005-4     Document Type: Article

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