Voters as a hard budget constraint: On the determination of intergovernmental grants

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 147-169

  Feld, Lars P ^a,b,c   Schaltegger, Christoph A ^b,d,e  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA)   (Switzerland)

^e UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544437267     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0265-1     Document Type: Article

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