The political determination of intergovernmental grants in Australia

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 3-4, 1998, Pages 299-315

  Worthington, Andrew C ^a   Dollery, Brian E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW ENGLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032383182     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017940409702     Document Type: Article

References (37)

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