Sharing information on computer systems security: An economic analysis

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 461-485

  Gordon, Lawrence A ^a   Loeb, Martin P ^a   Lucyshyn, William ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Cyber security; Homeland security; Information security economics; Information sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344899914     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2003.09.001     Document Type: Article

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