Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 185-198

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Kremer, Ilan ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35248872931     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-006-0011-2     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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