Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 475-487

  Kovalenkov, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Implementation; Large economies; Limit theorem; Strategy proofness; Walrasian mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036234809     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2788     Document Type: Article

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