The ultimate argument against Armstrong's contingent necessitation view of laws

Analysis

Volumn 65, Issue 286, 2005, Pages 147-155

  Bird, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249226685     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00542.x     Document Type: Review

References (13)

1. Armstrong, D. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2. Armstrong, D. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge Cambridge University Press
3. Armstrong, D. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. Bird, A. 2002. Laws and criteria. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 511-42
5. Bird, A. Forthcoming. Potency and modality. Synthese
6. Crane, T., ed. 1996. Dispositions: a Debate. London: Routledge
7. Dretske, F. 1977. Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44: 248-68
8. Handfield, T. Forthcoming. Armstrong and the modal inversion of dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly
9. Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell
10. MacBride, F. 1999. Could Armstrong have been a universal? Mind 108 471-501
11. Tooley, M. 1977. The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 667-98
12. Tweedale, M. 1984. Armstrong on determinable and substantival universals In D. M. Armstrong, Profiles, ed. R. J. Bogdan, 171-89. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
13. van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press