Dispositions and the principle of least action

Analysis

Volumn 64, Issue 283, 2004, Pages 206-214

  Katzav, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 31044436236     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00487.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press
2. Cartwright, N. 1989. Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford Oxford University Press
3. Chalmers, A. 1999. Making sense of laws of physics. In Causation and Laws of Nature, ed. H. Sankey, 3-16. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers
4. Ellis, B. 1999. Causal powers and laws of nature. In Causation and Laws of Nature, ed. H. Sankey, 19-34. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers
5. Ellis, B. 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
6. Fetzer, J. H. 1977. A world of dispositions. Synthese 34: 397-421
7. Harre, R. and E. H. Madden. 1975. Causal Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press
8. Lewis, D. 1983. New work for a theory of universals. Australasion Journal of Philosophy 61: 343-77
9. Mumford, S. 1998. Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press
10. Ramsey, F. P. 1978. Universais of law and fact. In his Foundations, ed D. H. Mellor, 128-32. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
11. Shoemaker, S. 1984. Identity, Cause and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
12. Stölzner, M. 2003. The principle of least action as the logical empiricist's shibboleth. Studies in the History of Modern Physics 34: 285-318
13. rd edition. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd