Intrinsic properties defined

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 209-219

  Vallentyne, Peter ^a  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748187410     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004250930900     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. See, David Lewis, "Extrinsic Properties," Philosophical Studies 44 ( 1983): 197200,
2. and Jaegwon Kim, "Psychological Supervenience," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 51-70.
3. Throughout, I restrict my attention to monadic properties, but it is possible to extend the definition to relations. Following David Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 62. We can say that a relation is intrinsic to its relata taken individually just in case it is entailed by the having of intrinsic properties of its relata (e.g., being taller is intrinsic in this sense, since it is entailed by intrinsic height properties). A relation is intrinsic to its relata taken together just in case it meets the proposed definition with the relata being treated as an object (e.g., being aware of is intrinsic in this, but not the former, sense, since for any two objects it is unaltered in the contraction). The relation of having more siblings, on the other hand, is not intrinsic in either sense, since it depends on how many siblings (which are distinct objects) each of the relata has.
4. One possible way of capturing the relevant notion of dependence is to appeal to relevance logic (according to which, roughly, A relevantly implies B only if A can be used non-vacuously to derive B). Michael Dunn defends this view in "Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 177-206,
5. and "Relevant Predication 1: The Formal Theory," Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1987): 347-381.
6. Ted Sider criticizes (successfully, I believe) Dunn's approach in "Intrinsic Properties," Philosophical Studies 83 (1996): 1-27. (Sider argues more generally in favor of Lewis's claim that no reductive definition of the intrinsicness is possible solely in terms quasi-logical vocabulary.) Here I shall not attempt to assess the adequacy of this approach. Instead, I shall provide a definition that makes no use of relevance logic, and argue that it is adequate. I should mention also that Rae Langten and David Lewis are in the process of developing another approach which takes the second definition of intrinsicness as its starting and then appeals to an independent distinction between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties. Their paper "Denning 'Intrinsic'" will be presented at the 1996 annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy.
7. This definition captures the notion of being intrinsic relative to an instant of time, which is the most common notion. Being 10 years old is not intrinsic on this conception, since having it depends on existence at prior times. The definition could be modified to capture the notion of being intrinsic relative to an object by dropping the temporal specification in the contraction condition, and replacing it with a temporal contraction to just those points at which the specified object exists. Being 10 years old would be intrinsic in that sense. One could also capture other notions of intrinsicness by modifying the definition to make it relative to a duration of time, or a set of times.
8. Note that the definitions of intrinsicness given here are definitions of when a property is intrinsic-not of when a property is intrinsic to a particular object. Consequently, some extrinsic properties will in an intuitive sense be intrinsic to whole worlds. For example, containing some and all of the red objects in the world is classified as an extrinsic property, even though the property is in a sense intrinsic (internal) to any whole world that has it. Likewise, being in a world with certain sorts of laws is classified as extrinsic, even though when a world has that property, it depends on nothing outside that world.
9. For further discussion of the difference between the two types of responsedependence of see Peter Vallentyne, "Response-Dependence, Rigidification, and Objectivity," Erkenntnis 44 (1995): 101-112.
10. I owe this point to Walter Edelberg and Al Casullo.
11. Somewhat more precisely: On an absolutist conception of space and time, spatial and temporal location properties will turn out to be intrinsic on the proposed definition. On a relational conception of space and time, however, objects would (presumably) lack the property of being at a specific location in the contracted world, since the relevant relations to other temporal and locations will not hold.
12. Consequently, on a relational theory such properties will not be classified as intrinsic on the proposed account. The problem remains even here, however, for identity properties (such as being identical to George Washington).
13. A related objection is that grueness (green at t and t is before 2000 A.D., or blue at t and t is on or after 2000 A.D.) is classified as intrinsic on the contraction account. Given the specific reference to 2000 A.D., this is a non-qualitative property as well. In "Intrinsic Properties" Ted Sider raises this problem for defining intrinsicness in general, but then sets it aside as non-qualitative. He agrees that the independence notion of intrinsicness is independent of the shared by duplicates notion.
14. I owe this point to David Braun and Ted Sider.
15. Thanks to David Braun, Albert Casullo, Walter Edelberg, David Lewis, Trenton Merricks, Gene Mills, Ted Sider, Raymond Woller, and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments.