Dynamic agency with renegotiation and managerial tenure

Management Science

Volumn 53, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 849-864

  Şabac, Florin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Dynamic agency; LEN models; Managerial tenure; Managerial turnover; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; CORRELATION METHODS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; TIME SERIES ANALYSIS;

DYNAMIC AGENCY; MANAGERIAL TENURE; MANAGERIAL TURNOVER; RENEGOTIATION;

MANAGERS;

EID: 34848884768     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0638     Document Type: Article

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