Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 477-486

  Schoonbeek, L ^a   Kooreman, P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031321187     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004907515703     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D. and de Vries, C.G. (1994). The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when r > 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates. Public Choice 81 : 363-380.
2. Ellingsen, T. (1991). Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review 81: 648-657.
3. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
4. Hillman, A.L. and Samet, J.G. (1987). Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice 54: 63-82.
5. Leininger, W. (1993). More efficient rent seeking - A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75: 43-62.
6. Takayama, A. (1985). Mathematical economics. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97-112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
8. Yang, C.L. (1993). Cooperation by credible threats: On the social costs of transfer contest under uncertainty. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 559-578.