Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 131-155

  Sun, Yeneng ^a   Yannelis, Nicholas C ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Core; Incentive compatibility; Negligible private information; Pareto efficiency; Walrasian allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548413686     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001     Document Type: Article

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