Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 222-241

  McLean, Richard P ^a   Postlewaite, Andrew ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Core; Incentive compatibility; Incomplete information; Informational size

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141615033     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00128-3     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Forges, F., Minelli, E., Vohra, R., 2002. Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. J. Math. Econ. 38, 1-41.
2. Forges, F., Mertens, J.-F., Vohra, R., 2002. The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects. Econometrica 70, 1865-1992.
3. Krasa, S., Shafer, W., 2001. Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete. Econ. Theory 18, 473-484.
4. McLean, R., Postlewaite, A., 2002a. Informational size and incentive compatibility. Econometrica 70, 2421-2453.
5. McLean, R., Postlewaite, A., 2002b. Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. Mimeo. University of Pennsylvania.
6. Postlewaite, A., Schmeidler, D., 1986. Implementation in differential information economies. J. Econ. Theory 39, 14-33.
7. Vohra, R., 1999. Incomplete information, incentive compatibility and the core. J. Econ. Theory 86, 123-147.