Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

Public Choice

Volumn 132, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 137-157

  López, Edward J ^a   Jewell, R Todd ^b  

^a SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Federalism; Political economy; Political institutions; Term limits

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547267255     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9139-4     Document Type: Article

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