Budget institutions and political insulation: Why states adopt the item veto

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 12, 2003, Pages 2677-2701

  de Figueiredo Jr , Rui J P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Line item veto; Political economy; Public budget institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142231925     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00167-6     Document Type: Article

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