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Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 221-229

Optimal effort allocation by U.S. Senators: The role of constituency size

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0031524351     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017960001456     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (20)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 0000703128 scopus 로고
    • Slicing the Federal government net spending pie: Who wins, who loses, and why
    • Atlas, C.M., Gilligan, T.W., Hendershott, R.J. and Zupan, M.A. (1994). Slicing the Federal government net spending pie: Who wins, who loses, and why. American Economic Review 85(3): 624-629.
    • (1994) American Economic Review , vol.85 , Issue.3 , pp. 624-629
    • Atlas, C.M.1    Gilligan, T.W.2    Hendershott, R.J.3    Zupan, M.A.4
  • 2
    • 0001618495 scopus 로고
    • Competition among pressure groups for political influence
    • Becker, G.S. (1983). Competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371-398.
    • (1983) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.98 , Issue.3 , pp. 371-398
    • Becker, G.S.1
  • 6
    • 84977324551 scopus 로고
    • Seats and spending: Legislative structure and median voter outcomes
    • Gilligan, T.W. and Matsusaka, J.G. (1994). Seats and spending: Legislative structure and median voter outcomes. Economic Inquiry 33(3): 383-401.
    • (1994) Economic Inquiry , vol.33 , Issue.3 , pp. 383-401
    • Gilligan, T.W.1    Matsusaka, J.G.2
  • 7
    • 0029484659 scopus 로고
    • Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last thirty years
    • Matsusaka, J.G. (1995). Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last thirty years. Journal of Political Economy 103(3): 587-623.
    • (1995) Journal of Political Economy , vol.103 , Issue.3 , pp. 587-623
    • Matsusaka, J.G.1
  • 8
    • 0002530894 scopus 로고
    • Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange
    • J.E. Alt and K.A. Shepsle (Eds.), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press
    • North, D.C. (1990). Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange. In J.E. Alt and K.A. Shepsle (Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy, 182-194. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    • (1990) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy , pp. 182-194
    • North, D.C.1
  • 10
    • 84935997850 scopus 로고
    • Constituent interest and congressional voting
    • Peltzman, S. (1984). Constituent interest and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 27(1): 181-210.
    • (1984) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.27 , Issue.1 , pp. 181-210
    • Peltzman, S.1
  • 11
    • 0000206660 scopus 로고
    • State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary institutions and politics
    • Poterba, J.M. (1994). State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary institutions and politics. Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 799-821.
    • (1994) Journal of Political Economy , vol.102 , Issue.4 , pp. 799-821
    • Poterba, J.M.1
  • 12
    • 0001713747 scopus 로고
    • Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending
    • Poterba, J.M. (1995). Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending. Journal of Public Economics 56(2): 165-188.
    • (1995) Journal of Public Economics , vol.56 , Issue.2 , pp. 165-188
    • Poterba, J.M.1
  • 13
    • 0000456233 scopus 로고
    • The theory of economic regulation
    • Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 2(1): 3-21.
    • (1971) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.2 , Issue.1 , pp. 3-21
    • Stigler, G.J.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.