The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 85-104

  Reed, W Robert ^a   Schansberg, D Eric ^b   Wilbanks, James ^a   Zhu, Zhen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032327462     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017950004344     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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