Retail buyer power through steering

Economics Letters

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 221-225

  Raskovich, Alexander ^a  

^a US Department of Justice   (United States)

Author keywords

Best price clauses; Buyer power; Credence services

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249988763     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.01.006     Document Type: Article

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