A dynamic theory of countervailing power

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 747-769

  Snyder, Christopher M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030363269     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555880     Document Type: Article

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