On the frequency of interior cournot-nash equilibria in a public good economy

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 401-408

  Buchholz, Wolfgang ^a,b   Cornes, Richard ^c   Peters, Wolfgang ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF REGENSBURG   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^d EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY VIADRINA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249045549     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. ANDREONI, J. (1988) Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism, Journal of Public Economics 35, 57-73.
2. ANDREONI, J., and M. C. MCGUIRE (1993) Identifying the free riders: A simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good, Journal of Public Economics 51, 447-454.
3. BERGSTROM, T. C., L. BLUME, and H. R. VARIAN (1986) On the private provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics 29, 25-49.
4. CORNES, R. C., and R. HARTLEY (2004) Aggregative public good games, University of Nottingham working paper number 03/04.
5. CORNES, R., and T. SANDLER (1996) The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
6. WARR, P. (1983) The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income, Economics Letters 13, 207-211.