Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes

Economics Letters

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 127-132

  Gaube, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

H41; Private provision of public goods, Group size

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545402     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00329-3     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Bergstrom T., Blume L., Varian H. On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics. 29:1986;25-49.
2. Bergstrom T., Blume L., Varian H. Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods. An improved proof. Journal of Public Economics. 49:1992;391-392.
3. Cornes R., Hartley R., Sandler T. Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in public good models: an elementary proof via contraction. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 1:1999;499-509.
4. Cornes R., Sandler T. Easy riders, joint production, and public goods. Economic Journal. 94:1984;580-598.
5. Cornes R., Sandler T. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. 2nd Edition :1996;Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6. Fries T.L., Golding E., Romano R. Private provision of public goods and the failure of the neutrality property in large finite economies. International Economic Review. 32:1991;147-157.
7. Isaac R.M., Walker J.M. Group size effects in public goods provision: the voluntary contribution mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 103:1988;179-200.
8. Isaac R.M., Walker J.M., Williams A.W. Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups. Journal of Public Economics. 54:1994;1-36.
9. Laffont J.J. Fundamentals of Public Economics. 1988;MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
10. Lipford J. Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: an examination of new evidence from churches. Public Choice. 83:1995;291-303.
11. McGuire M.C. Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under Cournot behavior. Public Choice. 18:1974;107-126.
12. Mueller D.C. Public Choice II. 1989;Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
13. Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action. 1965;Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
14. Olson M. Foreword. Sandler T. Collective Action. Theory and Applications. 1992;vii-xvi Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.
15. Pecorino P. The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting. Journal of Public Economics. 72:1999;121-134.
16. Sandler T. Collective Action. Theory and Applications. 1992;Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.