Wicksell, Lindahl and the theory of public goods

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 105, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 527-553

  Silvestre, Joaquim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Core; Lindahl; Power; Public goods; Wicksell

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; ECONOMIC THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 0347538114     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2003.00002.x     Document Type: Article

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