The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 171, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 429-433

  Young, H Peyton ^a,b,c  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamics; Equilibrium; Learning

Indexed keywords

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS; LEARNING SYSTEMS;

MULTI-AGENT LEARNING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34249001282     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2006.10.015     Document Type: Article

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