District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

Electoral Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 338-345

  Edwards, Martin S ^a   Thames, Frank C ^b  

^a SETON HALL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

District magnitude; Fiscal policy; Government expenditure; Personal vote

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; FISCAL POLICY; PUBLIC SPENDING; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 34248178958     PISSN: 02613794     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008     Document Type: Article

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