Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 465-486

  Ahlin, Christian ^a   Bose, Pinaki ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocation efficiency; Bribery; Bureaucratic delay; Corruption

Indexed keywords

BUREAUCRACY; CORRUPTION;

EID: 34248150837     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.12.002     Document Type: Article

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