Rent seeking and allocative efficiency: The case of Bribery

Pacific Economic Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 123-133

  Lien, Donald ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; CORRUPTION; ECONOMIC THEORY; RENT SEEKING;

EID: 0036258067     PISSN: 1361374X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Some economic costs of corruption in LDCS
2. Rent seeking with non-identical players
3. Corruption and development: A review of issues
4. A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets
5. Reform in the rent-seeking society
6. Rent-seeking promotes the provision of public goods
7. Strategic behavior in contests
8. Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly
9. Competition on many fronts. A Stackelberg signalling equilibrium
10. Protection for sale
11. Evolution in economic games
12. Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players
13. Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers
14. Politically contestable rents and transfers
15. The political economy of the rent seeking society
16. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders
17. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption
18. Entrepreneurship and economic development: The problem revisited
19. More efficient rent-seeking - A Munchhausen solution
20. A note on competitive bribery games
21. Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games
22. Coalitions in competitive bribery games
23. Corruption and allocation efficiency
24. Stackelberg rent-seeking
25. The welfare costs of tariffs: Monopolies and theft
26. Efficient rent seeking
27. The cost of rent seeking: A metaphysical problem
28. Measuring the deadweight costs of DUP and rent seeking activities