Achieving allocatively-efficient and strongly budget-balanced mechanisms in the network flow domain for bounded-rational agents

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1653-1654

  Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION; NETWORK FLOWS; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; STRATEGY PROOFS; VCG MECHANISM;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 33750987884     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (2)

1. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica, 45(2):427-38, March 1977.
2. Leonid Hurwicz. On the existence of allocation systems whose manipulative Nash equilibria are pareto-optimal. In 3rd World Congress of the Econometric Society (Unpublished), 1975.