Collective risk control and group security: The unexpected consequences of differential risk aversion

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 231-263

  Ihori, Toshihiro ^a   McGuire, Martin C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247233150     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00306.x     Document Type: Article

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