Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 8, 2002, Pages 1501-1520

  Vicary, Simon ^a   Sandler, Todd ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Neutrality theorem; Public goods; Weakest link

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; PUBLIC GOODS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036723921     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00103-9     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. On the private provision of public goods
2. Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods
3. Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods
4. Pareto-improving redistributions and pure public goods
5. From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods
6. From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction
7. International public goods and the case for foreign aid
8. The future of foreign assistance
9. Family policy with non-cooperative families
10. Global and regional public goods: A prognosis for collective action
11. Transfers and the weakest-link: An extension of Hirshleifer's analysis
12. The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income