A new approach to group structure, burden sharing, and the equilibrium provision of public goods

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 341-356

  McGuire, Martin C ^a   Shrestha, Ratna K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND   (Canada)

Author keywords

Altruism; Burden sharing; Collective action; Free riders; Group heterogeneity; Neutrality; Public goods; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043151431     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024694322469     Document Type: Conference Paper

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