A general criterion and an algorithmic framework for learning in multi-agent systems

Machine Learning

Volumn 67, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 45-76

  Powers, Rob ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a   Vu, Thuc ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Machine learning; Multi agent systems

Indexed keywords

BOUNDED MEMORY; COMPREHENSIVE COMPUTER TESTING;

LEARNING ALGORITHMS; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34147097403     PISSN: 08856125     EISSN: 15730565     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10994-006-9643-2     Document Type: Article

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