Foundation ownership and financial performance: Do companies need owners?

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 343-364

  Thomsen, Steen ^a   Rose, Caspar ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Company law and theory of the firm; Concentrated ownership; Corporate governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 17444409641     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-004-4277-y     Document Type: Article

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