The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

Public Choice

Volumn 130, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 267-292

  Bjørnskov, Christian ^a   Dreher, Axel ^b   Fischer, Justina A V ^c  

^a AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

^b ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Government; Life satisfaction

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847321501     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9081-5     Document Type: Article

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