A network pricing game for selfish traffic

Distributed Computing

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 255-266

  Hayrapetyan, Ara ^a   Tardos, Éva ^a   Wexler, Tom ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Network pricing games; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INTERNET; OPTIMIZATION; QUALITY OF SERVICE;

NETWORK PRICING GAMES; PRICE OF ANARCHY;

TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

EID: 33847312661     PISSN: 01782770     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00446-006-0020-y     Document Type: Conference Paper

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