Public observability of decisions and voluntary contributions in a multiperiod context

Public Finance Review

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 176-198

  Noussair, Charles ^a   Tucker, Steven ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Experimental; Informal sanctions; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847034785     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: 15527530     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1091142106290453     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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