A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 267-286

  De Sinopoli, Francesco ^a   Iannantuoni, Giovanna ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Nash equilibria; Proportional rule; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846523556     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0056-z     Document Type: Article

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