Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Public Choice

Volumn 130, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 79-98

  Eichenberger, Reiner ^a   Schelker, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Audit court; Institutional competition; Political control institution; Political economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846455113     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9073-5     Document Type: Article

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