Ist der Schweizer Föderalismus zu kleinräumig?

Swiss Political Science Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-18

  Schaltegger, Christoph A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005678390     PISSN: 14247755     EISSN: 16626370     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2001.tb00307.x     Document Type: Article

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