The International Criminal Court and universal jurisdiction: A close encounter?

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 49-68

  Bekou, Olympia ^b   Cryer, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846048372     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/lei149     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. Although Philip Allott might query this, see Philip Allott, The Health of Nations (CUP, Cambridge, 2003) 62-9.
2. See Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (OUP, Oxford, 2003).
3. See, eg, Phillipe Kirsch and John T Holmes, 'The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, The Negotiating Process' (1999) 93 AJIL 2
4. M Cherif Bassiouni, 'Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court' (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 443.
5. See nn 14-17, and accompanying text.
6. See, eg, David Scheffer, 'The United States and the International Criminal Court' (1999) 93 AJIL 12.
7. Art 12(3) also provides for jurisdiction where a State accepts the jurisdiction of the court on an ad hoc basis. It is notable that a State in this situation is obliged to cooperate with the ICC.
8. See, eg, Sharon A Williams, 'Article 12' in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999) 329
9. Zsuszsanna Deen-Racsmány, 'The Nationality of the Offender and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (2001) 95 AJIL 606.
10. See eg, Sharon A Williams, 'Article 13' in Triffterer, ibid 343.
11. See, eg, Prosecutor v Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1AR72, 2 Oct 1995, para 62.
12. Prosecutor v Ntuyuhaga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment ICTR-96-40-T, 18 Mar 1999
13. Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, SCSL-2004-15 AR 72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E) 13 Mar 2004, paras 67-71
14. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: Rules (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 604
15. Menno T Kamminga, 'Lessons Learned From the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over Gross Human Rights Abuses' (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 940.
16. Dapo Akande, 'The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618, 621-34.
17. Pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and their recognition in Art 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
18. See, eg, Héctor Olásolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2005) 128-9.
19. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 'Jurisdiction of the Court' in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer, The Hague, 1999) 127
20. Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kreß, 'Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises' (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 143.
21. ibid 154-5
22. Wilmshurst, op cit 132-3.
23. Hans-Peter Kaul, 'Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction' in Antonio Cassese, Paula Gaeta, and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 2003) 583, 613.
24. ibid 612.
25. Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (Transnational, New York, 2002) 118.
26. Rome Statute, preambular paras 3 and 9.
27. See, eg, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP, Cambridge, 1999).
28. Broomhall (n 2) 86-93
29. David Turns, 'Prosecuting Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position in the United Kingdom' (1999) 4 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 1, 3.
30. In the UK, for example, service members are being prosecuted for their alleged involvement in the killing of the Iraqi hotel receptionist, Baha Musa, see Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith) House of Lords Hansard, 19 July 2005, cols WS80-WS81.
31. Admittedly for the last argument, the possibility of this occurring is bound up with the extent that the ICC could be able to effectively exercise jurisdiction over such a person, and, as we will argue, the cooperation regime militates against this.
32. The advisability or otherwise of including passive personality jurisdiction in the Rome Statute's jurisdictional armoury is beyond the scope of this piece.
33. See also William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge, 2002) 75.
34. See, eg, Scheffer (n 5) 17-18.
35. ibid.
36. Ruth Wedgwood, 'The International Criminal Court: An American View' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 93.
37. See, eg, Madeline Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States' in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (Transnational, New York, 2000) 219.
38. For convincing refutation of both arguments see Akande (n 10) 620-40.
39. See also Bartram S Brown, 'US Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response' (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 855
40. Monroe Leigh, 'The United States and the Statute of Rome' (2001) 95 AJIL 124.
41. See, eg, Broomhall (n 2) 178-81.
42. For a taste of the tenor of some of the Bush administration's arguments see John R Bolton, 'The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court From an American Perspective' (2000-1) 41 Virginia Journal of International Law 186.
43. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2001, ICJ General List 121, 14 Feb 2002.
44. See, eg, Antonio Cassese, 'Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589, 592-3
45. Georges Abi-Saab, 'The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 596, 601.
46. George P Fletcher, 'Against Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 580.
47. Particularly strong defences of universal jurisdiction are Roger O'Keefe, 'Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept' (2004) 2 Journal of International Justice 735
48. and Albin Eser, 'For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism' (2003-4) 39 Tulsa Law Review 955.
49. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 'Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back' (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 375.
50. On the interplay between legal argumentation and political antipathy in this area see Diane F Orentlicher, 'Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal Court' (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 489.
51. For a strong defence of the ICC on jurisdiction see Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo, 'Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach' in Herman AM von Hebel, Johan G Lammers, and Jolien Schukking (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 1999) 129.
52. Lu Jianping and Wang Zhixiang, 'China's Attitude Towards the ICC' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 608, 610-12.
53. Although China did express its concurrence with US concerns over the ICC during the discussion around the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1593, See UN Doc S/PV.5158, p 5.
54. See, eg, Usha Ramanathan, 'India and the ICC' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 627.
55. As much is implied, ibid 631.
56. ie if the ICC had universal jurisdiction, without Russia's ratification of the Rome Statute. On the general position see Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, 'The ICC and Russian Constitutional Problems' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 621.
57. ICC/ASP/3/Res.1.
58. The links between Jurisdiction, cooperation and other issues are made very clear in, eg, Kaul and Kreß (n 13)
59. Mahnoush H Arsanjani, 'Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the International Criminal Court' in von Hebel et al (n 34) 57
60. Bert Swart and Göran Sluiter, 'The International Criminal Court and International Criminal Cooperation' ibid 92
61. Arbour and Bergsmo, op cit.
62. Rome Statute, Art 13, 15. See generally Olásolo (n 12) chs 2-3.
63. See, eg Bolton (n 28).
64. The truly surprising phenomenon of self-referrals does not alter this point, although admittedly it does prove that international criminal law has the capacity to outstrip expectations.
65. Which the vast majority of the 499 communications to the Prosecutor between July 2002 and July 2003 did, see ICC Press Release 16 July 2003, pids.009-2003-EN.
66. Law of 16 April 1993 Relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as Amended, (1999) International Legal Materials 921, Art 7.
67. For an overview see Damien Vandermeersch 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 400.
68. See, eg, Steven R Ratner, 'Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem' (2003) 97 AJIL 888.
69. See Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 215-20.
70. To which Rule 48 also requires the Prosecutor to refer to in making decisions in relation to proprio motu decisions.
71. See generally John Dugard, 'Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction With Truth Commissions' in Antonio Cassese, et al (eds) (n 15) 693
72. Michael P Scharf, 'The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 507
73. Darryl Robinson, 'Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court' (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 481.
74. The extraordinary specificity which has characterized the early budgets of the ICC ought to be sufficient to calm the most tremulous critic of the Rome regime of prosecutorial discretion, see, eg, Proposed Programme budget for 206 prepared by the Registrar, ICC-ASP/4/32.
75. Annex to the 'Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor: Referrals and Communications' 1.
76. See Kaul and Kreß (n 13) 155.
77. See, eg, Lionel Yee, 'The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16' in Lee (ed) (n 13) 143, 147-8.
78. See, eg, John T Holmes, 'Jurisdiction and Admissibility' in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational, New York, 2001) 321, 326.
79. See, eg, Payam Akhavan, 'The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court' (2005) 99 AJIL 403.
80. Situation in Uganda, Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Investigation in Uganda in Relation to the Application of Art 53, ICC-02/ 04-01/05, 2 Dec 2005, para 7.
81. See Robert Cryer, 'Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice' (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 195, 209-10.
82. ibid 211-13.
83. ie when, of the territorial, nationality, passive personality or custodial State, only the custodial State has ratified the Rome Statute.
84. It is true that Art 15 is not limited to 'situations', but it is limited to 'crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court' (Art 15(1)). In this instance, where custody is the only link, all other offenders not in the custody of State parties would not have committed crimes 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the ICC, thus would be beyond the reach of the Prosecutor's powers.
85. It also shows that were the ICC Statute to be altered to permit such jurisdiction, further changes to the Statute would have to be considered.
86. In relation to State-based referrals, there are situations in which this could, and would, be challenged.
87. And that is the sole basis of jurisdiction.
88. Antonio Cassese, 'On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law' (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 2, 13.
89. See James Crawford, 'An International Criminal Court?' (1997) 12 Connecticut Journal of International Law 255, 256.
90. See the Rome Statute, Art 63
91. Which reads: 'States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.'
92. This differs from the relevant provision of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda where Art 29 of the ICTY Statute (Art 28 of the ICTR Statute) is the sole, but all-encompassing provision.
93. See also Rome Statute, Art 59(1)(7).
94. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford, 2003) 358.
95. See, eg, Kimberly Prost, 'Article 88' in Triffterer (ed) (n 7) 1069.
96. Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 Oct 1997, (IT-95-14-AR108bis), para 26 refers to the obligation as being erga omnes, but this is not strictly accurate. As was noted in Prosecutor v Bagosora, Decision on Defence Motion to Obtain Cooperation From the Vatican Pursuant to Art 28, ITCR-98-41-T, 13 May 2004, para 3, there is no obligation on non-UN Member States to comply.
97. Arts 34-8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331.
98. Art 87(6) provides for requests for cooperation to International Organisations. The ICC has entered into an agreement on cooperation with the EU, see ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20060410-132-En 10 Apr 2006.
99. See also Rule 44E.
100. The wording used ('The Court may invite...') is indicative of this.
101. Göran Sluiter, 'The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court' (2003) 25 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 605, 610.
102. Although SC referral is provided for in Art 13(b), no mention is made of cooperation in this Article. The only reference to cooperation in cases of referral is Art 87(7) which deals with failure to cooperate following a SC referral.
103. Sudan has signed, but not ratified the Rome Statute.
104. Operative para 2.
105. This resolution also confirms that there is no customary obligation on States to cooperate with the Court; such a suggestion is canvassed, however, in Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost, 'Article 87' in Triffterer (ed) (n 7) 1055, 1063-4.
106. Again, absent an obligation imposed on UN members by Security Council Resolution.
107. Rome Statute, Arts 89(1) and 93(1).
108. ibid Arts 89(2), 94, and 95.
109. ibid Arts 93(1)(1), 93(3), 93(4), 90, and 98.
110. See, eg, Antonio Cassese, 'The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 144, 164-7.
111. See, eg, Schabas (n 24) 130.
112. See Paolo Benvenuti, 'Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Jurisdictions' in Flavia Lattanzi and William A Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Il Sirente, Ripa Fagano Alto, 1999) 21, p 50.
113. See 10th Preambular para, Arts 1 and 17 ICC Statute.
114. Art 17 ICC Statute.
115. See (n 93).
116. Which is not the case in relation to at least the DRC self-referral. The DRC has transferred Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to the custody of the ICC, see ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20060302-125-En, 17 Mar 2006. On some of the reasons for the DRC's self-referral (which are equally applicable to cooperation) see William W Burke-White, 'Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo' (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 557.
117. Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, Sept 2003, available at 6.
118. See, eg, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton UP, Princeton, 2004).
119. For cogent critique of aspects of Slaughter's theory see, however José Alvarez, 'Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory' (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 183.
120. On which, see Alejandro M Garro, 'Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?' (1993-4) 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 12-14.
121. Declarations pursuant to Art 87(1)(a) of Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland (although Finland permits other appropriate authorities to be contacted by the Court), Germany, Honduras, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, and FYROM (available at ).
122. Declarations of (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, (DRC, Estonia, France (or the Ministry of Justice), Lithuania (or the Ministry of Justice)) (all available ibid). Austria, Brazil, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Timor-Leste, and the UK have expressed no preference.
123. Many of whom have identified diplomatic channels as the relevant ones, See, eg, declarations of Andorra, Australia, Belize, Colombia, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Mali, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Panama, Samoa, and Sierra Leone (all available ibid). This method leaves discretion in the ICC who to address correspondence to, and the diplomatic channels who to deliver it to.
124. Art 87(1)(a) and (3) ICC Statute.
125. See Situation in Uganda, Decision on Prosecutor's Application for Unsealing of the Warrants of Arrest ICC-02/04-01/05, 13 Oct 2005 [hereinafter 'Unsealing Decision'] paras 14, 17, and 20.
126. There are concerns that the level of protection may not prove enough, see Situation in Uganda, Decision to Convene a Status Conference Related to Safety and Security in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, 25 Nov 2005.
127. See Prosecutor v Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-T, 2 Aug 2001, para 78.
128. See Prosecutor v Tadić, Order for the Prosecution to Investigate the False Testimony of Dragan Opacić IT -94-1, T, 10 Dec 1996.
129. See Unsealing Decision para 14, which cites the Prosecutor's argument that unsealing the warrants was 'a feasible and powerful means of garnering international attention and support for arrest efforts, thus further ensuring the protection of victims, potential witnesses and their families'.
130. The arrest warrant for Lubanga Dyilo was only made public after the plane carrying him to the Hague left DRC airspace, see Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo. Decision to Unseal the Warrant of Arrest Against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Related Documents ICC-01/04-01/06-37, 17 Mar 2006.
131. Hans-Peter Kaul, 'Construction Site for More Justice: The International Criminal Court After Two Years' (2005) 99 AJIL 370, 383.
132. Unless the Security Council has required them to do so.
133. As Lattanzi, criticizing the German proposal observed, 'Dans chaque phase de son activité, la Cour pénale internationale, à l'instar de deux Tribunaux pénaux institués par le Conseil de sécurité, aura besoin de la collaboration des Etats. Elle devra done agir avec la collaboration au moins de certains des Etats ayant un lien avec le crime et ne pourra pas agir contre leur volonté.' See Flavia Lattanzi, 'Compétence de la Cour Pénale Internationale et Consentement des Etats' (1999) 103 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 425, 433.
134. See also (n 52).
135. Its practice in relation to the ICTY does not give great reason for hope. See, eg, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/ PRST/ 1996/23; and, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1996/34. The closest the SC has come to explicitly requesting compliance Res 1207, 17 Nov 1998, S/RES/1207 (1998). Equally, the Council, in referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC exceeded expectations, so perhaps there is room for (very) cautious) optimism.
136. The argument is critiqued along the lines that follow, in William A Schabas, 'The International Criminal Court: The Secret of its Success' (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 415, 418-19.
137. Kofi Annan 'Preface', in Lee (n 13) ix, ix.
138. Indeed, one of the problems the ICC will face is the 'impunity gap' in the situations it deals with, as it cannot prosecute any more than a small sample of offences in any one conflict, and cannot force other States to do so.
139. See Schabas (n 118) 417-19. Although the question of passive personality jurisdiction is, strictly, beyond this article's parameters, the temptation to note that granting such jurisdiction might have prompted more ratifications (from States seeking to protect their nationals) is irresistible.