Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 557-590

  Burke White, William W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

complementarity; Democratic Republic of Congo; global governance; International Criminal Court; Joseph Kabila

Indexed keywords

EID: 39649121938     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156505002876     Document Type: Article

References (188)

1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17. See also J. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), 41; J. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, in A. Cassesse (ed.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 667 (noting that ‘Ironically, however, the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution thatmay never be employed').
2. See Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 1, at 667 (noting: ‘Of course, in reality there is a need for the ICC, since States may be unwilling to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes').
3. This new scholarship can largely be traced to the writings of James Rosenau's seminal work in 1992. See J. Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (1992) 1, at 4. Elements of global governance thinking can be found in the earlier writings of the English School in political science. See generally, H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (1977). The growing scholarship in the field of global governance led to the foundation of a new journal in themid-1990s entitled Global Governance, which has been the focal point of writings on the topic.
4. J. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a TurbulentWorld (1997), at 45.
5. In the global governance literature, such interactions are said to occur along a governance frontier. Rosenau suggests that the frontier is ‘space inwhich world affairs unfold. the arena in which domestic and foreign issues intermesh’. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a TurbulentWorld note 4, at 5.
6. On 8 September 2003 Prosecutor LouisMoreno-Ocampo announced that the situation in the Ituri region of theDemocratic Republic of Congowould be the first ‘whichmerits to be closely followed by the Office’ of the Prosecutor. LuisMoreno-Ocampo, SecondAssembly of States Parties to the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/030909 prosecutor speech.pdf.
7. For a general discussion of such research, see D. Silverman (ed.), Qualitative Research, Theory, Method and Practice (2004).
8. J.Maxwell (ed.), Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (1996), 19-20.
9. For a discussion of the basic techniques used in qualitative interview analysis, see J. Miller and B. Glassner, ‘The “inside” and the “outside”: Finding realities in interviews’, in Silverman, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach note 7, at 125-35; J.Morse, ‘Emerging from the Data: The Cognitive Process of Analysis in Qualitative Inquiry’, in J.Morse (ed.), Critical Issues in Qualitative ResearchMethods (1994) 44, at 56.
10. For a consideration of documentary analysis in qualitative research see ‘Analyzing Documentary Realities’, in Silverman, For a discussion of the basic techniques used in qualitative interview analysis note 7, 56 at 56-76.
11. M. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and ResearchMethods (1990), 169.
12. See Maxwell, Qualitative Evaluation and ResearchMethods note 8, at 70-2.
13. For a discussion, see Qualitative Evaluation and ResearchMethods., at 73.
14. For a consideration of how these techniques can be employed to enhance the validity of qualitative research results, see For a discussion., at 90-5.
15. InternationalRescue Committee, ‘Mortality inthe DemocraticRepublic of Congo:Results from aNationwide Survey’, Conducted September-November 2002, Reported in April 2003, at i, (noting that ‘Based on past and current IRC data, it is estimated that 3.3 million people have died as a result of this war').
16. R. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo (2002), at 218-21. Reports suggest that during this drive for power, Kabila's army murdered thousands-if not tens of thousands-of Hutu militiamen and their supporters. Edgerton, InternationalRescue Committee, at 229.
17. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo note 16, at 221, 223-7.
18. Edgerton., at 229.
19. See Edgerton., at 230. For a discussion of Rwanda's motivations for action in Congo, see T. Longman, ‘The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo’, in J. Clark (ed.), The African Roots of theCongoWar (2002), 128, at 136 (noting ‘opportunity for both personal and national enrichment'). Rwanda's previously non-existent exports of coaltan rose to US$20 million per month after the occupation. Similarly, diamond exports rose from 166 carats per year in 1998 to 30,500 carats in 2000. Longman, Edgerton, at 136. Coaltan is a valuable and scarce mineral used in the production of cell phones and other electronic devices. For a discussion of Uganda'smotivations, see J. Clark, ‘Museveni's Adventure in the CongoWar’, in Edgerton, at 145-165.
20. Human RightsWatch, Democratic Republic of Congo:War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandanbacked Rebels to theMay 2002Mutiny 5. See Edgerton, For a discussion of Rwanda's motivations for action in Congo note 16, at 230-2.
21. Human RightsWatch, Human RightsWatch, Democratic Republic of Congo:War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandanbacked Rebels to theMay 2002Mutiny 5 note 20, at 5.
22. Edgerton, Human RightsWatch note 16, at 230.
23. Edgerton., at 229.
24. For a discussion of these crimes in Ituri, see ‘Ituri: Covered in Blood: Ethnically Targeted Violence in NortheasternDRCongo’, Human RightsWatch Report (July 2003) (noting that ‘Human RightsWatch estimates that at least 5,000 civilians died from direct violence in Ituri between July 2002 and March 2003. These victims are in addition to the 50,000 civilians that the United Nations estimates died there since 1999). See also, D. Bergner, ‘TheMost UnconventionalWeapon’, The New York TimesMagazine, 26 October 2003.
25. This framework is memorialized in the Global Inclusive Agreement which concluded the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.See'AccordGlobalet Inclusif sur laTransitionenRé publiqueDé mocratiqueduCongo’,17dé cembre 2002, adopted at Sun City, SouthAfrica, 1April 2003, reprinted in JournalOfficiel de la Ré publiqueDémocratique du Congo, 44 anné e, 5 April 2003.
26. See Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition En Ré publique Dé mocratique Du Congo, This framework is memorialized in the Global Inclusive Agreement which concluded the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.See'AccordGlobalet Inclusif sur laTransitionenRé publiqueDé mocratiqueduCongo’ note 25, at Art. 1 (providing: ‘Les Parties au pré sent Accord et ayant des forces combattantes, a savoir le Gouvernement de laRDC, leRCD, leMLC, leRCD-ML, leRCD-N, et lesMaiMai renouvellent leur engagement, conformé ment a l'accord de Lusaka. de cesser les hostilité s et de rechercher une solution pacifique et é quitable a’ la crise que traverse le pays').
27. See generally, Bergner, Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition En Ré publique Dé mocratique Du Congo note 24.
28. See generally, Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition En Ré publique Dé mocratique Du Congo.; ‘Ituri: Covered in Blood’, Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition En Ré publique Dé mocratique Du Congo note 24.
29. International Crisis Group, ‘Congo Crisis:Military Intervention in Ituri’, 13 June 2003, ICG Africa ReportNo. 64, at i.
30. ‘Congo Crisis:Military Intervention in Ituri’., at 1.
31. See ‘Ituri: Covered in Blood’, ‘Congo Crisis:Military Intervention in Ituri’ note 24.
32. ‘World Briefing Africa: Congo: U.N. Finds NewMassacre’, The New York Times, 11 October 2003.
33. ‘DR Congo Slams Rwandan Invasion’, BBC News, 3 June 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/world/africa/3771729.stm.
34. The Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the ICC to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute in July 2002.
35. Article 14 of the Rome Statute grants any state party the power to refer a case within the jurisdiction of the Court to the Prosecutor. It was initially assumed that most such referrals would involve a state party on whose territory the crime did not occur referring the situation in another state to the Court. See P. Kirsch, ‘Referral by States Parties’, in Cassesse, The Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the ICC to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute in July note 1, at 619.
36. Article 15 of the Rome Statute gives the Prosecutor the authority to ‘initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’ if the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’. Rome Statute, Article 15. See also P. Kirsch and D. Robinson, ‘Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor’, in Cassesse, Article 14 of the Rome Statute grants any state party the power to refer a case within the jurisdiction of the Court to the Prosecutor note 1, at 657.
37. Such an approach is largely based on liberal international relations theory. For a discussion of this approach, see A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, (1997) 51 Int'l Org. 513.
38. This framework is memorialized in the Global Inclusive Agreement which concluded the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. See Accord Global Et Inclusif sur la Transition en Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo, Such an approach is largely based on liberal international relations theory note 25.
39. Constitution De La Transition, infra note 84, at Art. 83 (according to which ‘Les Vice-Pré sidents sont issues respectivement des Composantes Gouvernement de la Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo, le Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dé mocratie (le RCD), le Mouvement de Libé ration du Congo (MLC) et l'opposition politique').
40. See Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo, Constitution De La Transition note 25, at Art. IV(providing that ‘Les é lections se tiennent dans les 24mois qui suivent le dé but de la pé riode de transition'). The elections were originally scheduled for July 2005 but it now seems inevitable that a one-year extension provided for in the Constitution will be exercised.
41. Though the actual implications of such an indictment or prosecution in the DR Congo remain to be seen, the impact on governmental officials, such as Slobodan Milošević and Charles Taylor, are already evident. For a discussion with respect to Milošević, see A. Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court’, (2003) 97 AJIL 510, at 544 (asking if ‘the Prosecutor [should]worryabout therisksof destabilizing delicatepolitical situations through thepublicizing of investigations or the bringing of charges’ and discussing the implications of the Milošević indictment). See also P. Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities’, (2001) 95 AJIL 7, at 9 (suggesting that ‘the ICTY helped to delegitimizeMilosevic's leadership').
42. See Edgerton, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities’ note 16, at 231.
43. Malik Dechambenoit, MONUC Political Officer, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez, Yuriko Kuga and LeslieMedema).
44. J. Astill, ‘Congo Cannibalism Claim Provides First Challenge’, Guardian, 11March 2003.
45. M. Lacey, ‘Hope Glimmering asWar Retreats from Congo’, The New York Times, 21 October 2003.
46. J. Astill, ‘Fighters Now Hold Their Punches in Muhammad Ali's Congo Hotel’, The Guardian, 25 September 2003 (noting that Ruberwa is ‘the former leader of a brutal Rwandan-backed rebel group’ and perhaps the most loathedman in Congo').
47. Case Concerning theArrestWarrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium),Merits, 2002, at para 10. Theproceedings against Ndombasi were stopped by the decision of the International Court of Justice in Congo v. Belgium, which held that the prosecution of Ndombasi violated the principle of sovereign immunity as he was then sitting foreignminister of Congo. ‘Fighters Now Hold Their Punches in Muhammad Ali's Congo Hotel’.
48. J. Kabila, ‘Intervention du Pré sident de la Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo a la 58è me session de l'Assemblé e Gé né rale des Nations Unies’, New York, 24 September 2003 : ‘Sur le plan international, nous pensons que le principal objectif en cette matiè re est, a’ titre de rappel, l'é tablissement, avec l'assistance des Nations Unies, d'un Tribunal Pé nal International pour la Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo, pour connaî tre des crimes de gé nocide, des crimes contre l'humanité, y compris les viols utilisé s comme armes de guerre, et de violations massives des Droits de l'Homme. Par ailleurs, en vue d'assurer une couverture optimale en matiè re de protection des droits de l'homme ainsi que des droits humanitaires, la Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo a ratifié plusieurs conventions internationales dont le Statut de Rome instituant la Cour pé nale internationale’.
49. For discussions including the implications of such prosecutions as part of a transitional justice programme see generally M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (1999); R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2002).
50. For a discussion of political cost externalization in the context of international criminal prosecutions see W. Burke-White, ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Justice’, (2003) 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, at 39-40, 47-54.
51. Annexto the ‘PaperonSomePolicy Issues Before theOffice of the Prosecutor’:Referrals and Communications, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy annex final 210404.pdf.
52. Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003 at 5, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905 Policy Paper.pdf.
53. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Preamble.
54. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court., at Art. 53(1)(c).
55. See A/CONF.183.C.1/SR.7, Rome Conference Travaux, 183; G. Turone, ‘Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor’, in Cassesse, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 1, at 1137, at 1142.
56. For a commentary on the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute based on this substation model, see Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, Rome Conference Travaux note 1. See also F. Lattanzi, ‘The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2001) at 177.
57. For abreakdownof these portfolios, see BalancingPeace, Justice,andStability:ASpecialTribunal for theDemocratic Republic of Congo,WoodrowWilson School of Public and International Affairs (2004) at Appendix B (on file with author). Though Minister of Justice Ngoy is himself from the Unarmed Opposition, he reports directly to Vice President Ruberwa of the RCD. For a commentary on the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute based on this substation model.
58. See 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17(2).
59. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court., at Art. 17. The legal proceedings required to determine admissibility where the national state seeks to assert primacy involve a full review by the Pre-Trial Chamber, likely taking a considerable period of time. Article 18 requires the prosecutor to defer a case for six months when the national state claims it is investigating the matter. Similarly, Article 18 grants the national state a right to appeal a decision of admissibility by the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber. Even if heard on an expedited basis, such proceedings could well continue through the election period.
60. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/030909 prosecutor speech.pdf.
61. For a discussion of how an enhanced judiciary could serve this purpose, see Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC note 1.
62. JoeWells, InternationalHumanRights Law Group, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, 27 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
63. Honorius Kisimba-Ngoy, Minister of Justice, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, 29 October 2003, (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
64. JoeWells, InternationalHumanRights Law Group, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, 27 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
65. Honorius Kisimba-Ngoy, Minister of Justice, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, 29 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
66. Report of the University of Amsterdam-No PeaceWithout Justice ExpertsMeeting, October 2004.
67. Olela Okondji, Director of the Cabinet to the Minister of Human Rights, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 29 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
68. TheCommission'sformalnameis theCommissionPermanente de ReformeduDroit Congolais.Personal Interview, Director of the Cabinet to the Minister of Human Rights, Ms Olela Okondji, Kinshasa, 29 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
69. See ‘DemocraticRepublic of theCongo:Confronting Impunity’,HumanRightsWatch Briefing Paper, January 2004, at VI(b). The draft law ‘provides a comprehensive definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide’. In addition, it pledges the DRC to ‘work with the ICC to prosecute such crimes’. Finally, it expands the jurisdiction of civilian courts to try soldiers accused ofwar crimes and crimes against humanity. TheCommission'sformalnameis theCommissionPermanente de ReformeduDroit Congolais.
70. Procureur of Kisangani, Personal Interview, 30 October 2004, Kisangani DRC (interview conducted by Christopher Broughton andMariyan Zumbulev).
71. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
72. ‘Another Key Ituri Leader Arrested’, Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22March 2005; ‘Warlord Arrest for Killings’, BBC News, 1March 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4308583.stm.
73. Xavier Ciribanya, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 30 October 2003.
74. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October, 2003.
75. Dr Kyue-Ndondo, President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 27 October 2003.
76. J. Dugard, ‘Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions’, in Cassesse, President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission note 1, at 700. See also M. Scharf, ‘The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, (1998) 32 Cornell Int'l L. J. 507.
77. Dugard, ‘Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions’ note 82, at 702.
78. Constitution De La Transition, Journal Officiel de la Ré publique Dé mocratique du Congo, 44 anné e, 5 April 2003, at Art. 154 (noting: ‘Les Institutions d'appui a la dé mocratie sont:. La Commission vé rité et ré conciliation').
79. Dr Kyue-Ndondo, President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 27 October 2003.
80. See ‘Truth Commission to be Established in Kinshasa’, AFOL News, 19 February 2004, available at http://www.afrol.com/articles/11310.
81. See Y. Kabamab, ‘National Consultations on DRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, 19 February 2004, MONUC Press Release, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=1952. See also, ‘Truth Commission to be Established in Kinshasa,’ AFOL News, 19 February 2004, available at http://www.afrol.com/articles/11310.
82. Organic Law, 30 July 2004, cited in'AFirst FewSteps:The LongRoad to a Just Peace in theDemocraticRepublic of Congo’, International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper, October 2004 at 39-40, available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/ICTJ.DRC.Eng.pdf.
83. For a discussion of the appropriate range of powers for such a TRC, see W. W. Burke-White, ‘Reframing Impunity’, (2002) 42Harv. J. Int'l L. 467. For a discussion of similarly situated TRCs, see P.Hayner Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001).
84. Organic Law, For a discussion of the appropriate range of powers for such a TRC note 88, at 43. It is worth noting that this amnesty provision has changed several times in the drafting process.
85. Organic Law, It is worth noting that this amnesty provision has changed several times in the drafting process note 88, at Art. 41.
86. Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 26 October 2003.
87. Round Table with Victims Groups, Personal Interview, Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 October 2003.
88. For a more general critique of the Commission, see ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper, October 2004, at 39-40, available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/ICTJ.DRC.Eng.pdf.
89. William Lacy Swing, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 31 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez).
90. 1998 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17(2).
91. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court., at Art. XVII (3).
92. Theword ‘genuine'waschosen inacompromiseto avoid seeminglymore intrusive scrutiny by the ICCunder the proposed language of an ‘effective’ investigation or prosecution.At the very least, a genuine investigation or prosecution seems to be one that is undertaken with some diligence and could, potentially, lead to the criminal liability of the accused. SeeOTP Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Praxis (2003) 8 para. 22. On this matter, cf. J. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court note 1, at 49.
93. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, Theword ‘genuine'waschosen inacompromiseto avoid seeminglymore intrusive scrutiny by the ICCunder the proposed language of an ‘effective’ investigation or prosecution note 1, at 674.
94. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’ note 1, at 49.
95. The Pre-trial Chamber will make apply the complementarity provisions tomake determinations of admissibility. For a discussion, see Lattanzi, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ note 58, at 49 (observing: ‘it is always up to the Court to decide on issues of complementarity').
96. See text The Pre-trial Chamber will make apply the complementarity provisions tomake determinations of admissibility parts 3 and 4.
97. Article 17 of the Rome Statute starts from the presumption that cases are admissible before the ICC. The Court is instructed to deem the case inadmissible if it is ‘being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.
98. ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity’, Article 17 of the Rome Statute starts from the presumption that cases are admissible before the ICC note 71, at IV.
99. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity’ note 1, at 678.
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at Art. 14. For a more detailed discussion of judicial independence see, e.g., S. Shetreet and J. Deschenes (eds.), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985).
101. Transparency International, ‘The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’, available at http://www. transparency.org/building coalitions/codes/bangalore conduct.html.
102. DominiqueKamuanduandTheoKasonga,AvocatesSansFrontiè res,Personal Interview,Kinshasa,DRCongo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga. Human RightsWatch confirms that ‘the latest figures released by the Ministry of Justice show that as of 1998, there were only 1448 judges and prosecutors inthe entire country'). See ‘DemocraticRepublic of theCongo:Confronting Impunity’, Transparency International note 71, at IV(b).
103. Dean of the Faculty of Law,University of Kinshasa, Personal Interview, Kinshasa,DRCongo, 27 October 2003. M. Mirindi, for example, completed an LL.M. at the Free University of Brussels.
104. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October, 2003.
105. For a discussion of the problems with finding adequately trained judicial personnel in East Timor, see Burke-White, ProsecutingMagistrate note 52, at 61-75.
106. Memorandumdu SyndicatAutonome desMagistrats de la Ré publiqueDémocratique du Congo,Kinshasa, 25August 2003, cited in ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity,’ For a discussion of the problems with finding adequately trained judicial personnel in East Timor note 71, at IV(a).
107. ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity,’ note 88, at 24.
108. ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity’, ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ note 71, at IV(a).
109. ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity’., at IV(d).
110. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003; Personal Interview, Chief of the Cabinet of the Judiciary, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
111. Dominique Kamuandu and Theo Kasonga, Avocats Sans Frontiè res, Personal Interview,Kinshasa,DRCongo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga). See also Personal Interview, Luc Heymans, Director, UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kinshasa, Congo, 25 October 2003.
112. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
113. Jo Wells, Human Rights Law Group, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, Congo, 25 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga and LeslieMedema).
114. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17(3).
115. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 1, at 677.
116. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity,’ ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’ note 1, at 49.
117. For a discussion of the evaluation of judicial infrastructure and capacity in EU member states, which obviously requires a higher standard than what could be expected in post-conflict states in Africa, see EUMAPMonitoring on Judicial Capacity (2002), available at http://www.eumap.org/topics/judicial.
118. For a general discussion on the role of courts in Africa, see J.Widner, Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa (2001).
119. Personal visit and interview, Supreme Court of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 25 October 2003.
120. Yenyi Olungu Victor, Premier Avocat Gé né ral de la Ré publique, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 29 October 2003 (interview conducted by LeslieMedema, Yuriko Kuga and Adrian Alvarez).
121. It seems most unlikely that the available facilities are sufficient to support comprehensive judicial activities for a country of 56 million. See CIA World Fact Book: Democratic Republic of Congo, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html.
122. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
123. The case, being tried in a military, rather than a civilian court, involves 22 individuals suspected of serious human rights violations in Ankoro, Katanga Province. See ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ProsecutingMagistrate note 88, at 18-20.
124. Jo Wells, Human Rights Law Group, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 25 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga and LeslieMedema).
125. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
126. Procureur of Kisangani, Personal Interview, 30 October 2004, Kisangani DR Congo (interview conducted by Christopher Broughton andMariyan Zumbulev).
127. Only 54 of the 180 ‘Tribunaux de Paix’ were established byMay 2004. See ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Procureur of Kisangani note 88, at 24.
128. Personal Interview, JohnMeyers,UNOffice of Community andHumanitarian Affairs, Bukavu,DR Congo, 28 October 2003. Many of the problems with Baraza stem from its exclusion of women and ethnic minorities from deliberation proceedings. Personal Interview, PAIF, Promotion et Appui aux Initiatives Feminines, Goma, DR Congo, 31 October 2003 (interview conducted by Dawn Hewett and Barbara Feinstein).
129. Honorius Kisimba-Ngoy, Minister of JusticeofDRCongo, Personal Interview, Kinshasa,DRCongo, 29 October 2003 (interview conducted by LeslieMedema, Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga).
130. See ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Minister of JusticeofDRCongo note 88, at 24.
131. M. Mirindi, ProsecutingMagistrate, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
132. Chief of the Cabinet of the Judiciary, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
133. LucHeymans, Director,UNOffice of theCoordination ofHumanitarianAffairs, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 25 October 2003.
134. Personal visit, Goma Provincial Prison, 31 October 2003.
135. Father Giovanni, Kisangani Catholic Parish of the Sacred Heart, Personal Interview, 30 October 2003, Kisangani, DR Congo (interview by Christopher Broughton andMariyan Zumbulev).
136. Prisons in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Series of Reports Commissioned by the Refuge Documentation Center Ireland 5 (2002) available athttp://www.ecoi.net/pub/sb47/rdc-cod-prison0502.pdf.A1994 report byHumanRightsWatch reached a similar conclusion. See ‘Prison Conditions in Zaire’,HumanRightsWatch Report (1994).
137. LucHeymans, Director,UNOffice of theCoordination ofHumanitarianAffairs, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DRCongo,25October 2003.For reference tominimuminternational standards of detention, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at Art. 10.
138. Lattanzi, Director,UNOffice of theCoordination ofHumanitarianAffairs note 58, at 181.
139. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17(1)(a).
140. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 20.
141. See generally, Dugard, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 82.
142. Examples of such blanket amnesties denying national courts jurisdiction over particular offences include Law of Amnesty, No. 2.191 (18 April 1978) (Chile) reprinted in AmericasWatch, Human Rights and the ‘Politics Of Agreements’: Chile During President Aylwin's First Year (1991) 32; First Amnesty Law of 14 June 1995, No. 26479 (1995) (Peru). Such an amnesty could also be a strong indication of the unwillingness of the state to investigate or prosecute crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.
143. See 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 29.
144. Apparently any crime involving a firearm tends to end up in the military system. Personal Interview, Dominique Kamuandu and Theo Kasonga, Avocates Sans Frontiè res, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga).
145. ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Apparently any crime involving a firearm tends to end up in the military system note 88, at 20.
146. ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity,’ ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ note 71, at VI(a); Personal Interview, Dominique Kamuandu and Theo Kasonga, Avocates Frontiè res, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga). See also, ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ note 88, at 20 (suggesting that the definitions of crimes in themilitary penal code ‘do not conform to international definitions and are, at best, ambiguous').
147. ASADHO Organization, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga).
148. ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, ASADHO Organization note 88, at
149. This view was also expressed by the Congolese office of Avocates Sans Frontiè res. Personal Interview, Dominique Kamuandu and Theo Kasonga, Avocates Sans Frontiè res, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez and Yuriko Kuga).
150. Dean of the Faculty of Law,University of Kinshasa, Personal Interview, Kinshasa,DRCongo, 28 October 2003. M. Mirindi, for example, completed an LL.M. at the Free University of Brussels.
151. ‘A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Dean of the Faculty of Law note 88, at 21.
152. Presidential Decree no. 03-001 of 15 April 2003, on amnesty for acts of war, political crimes and crimes of opinion, Art. 1.
153. Article 24of theCongoleseCriminalCodestipulates a ten-year statute of limitations for crimespunishableby a jail sentence ofmore than five years. See ‘A First FewSteps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in theDemocratic Republic of Congo’, on amnesty for acts of war, political crimes and crimes of opinion note 88, at 22.
154. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Art. 17(3).
155. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 1, at 49.
156. Marie France, MONUC Kisangani Political Affairs Director, Personal Interview, 29 October 2003, Kisangani, DR Congo (interview conducted byMariyan Zumbulev and Christopher Broughton).
157. Nishkala Suntharalingam, MONUC Political Officer, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 26 October 2003.
158. See ‘AnotherKey Ituri Leader Arrested’, Integrated Regional InformationNetworks, 22March 2005; ‘Warlord Arrest for Killings’, BBC News, 1March 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4308583.stm.
159. For a discussion of the standard contingent of a war crimes investigation team as early as the SecondWorld War, see T. Borek, ‘Legal Services DuringWar’, (1998) 120 Mil. L. Rev. 19, at n. 90.
160. For a discussion of the standard contingent of a war crimes investigation team as early as the SecondWorld War., at IV(c).
161. See ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity’, For a discussion of the standard contingent of a war crimes investigation team as early as the SecondWorld War note 71, at IV(c).
162. See UNSCOR 1355 (2001).
163. SeeMONUC CIVPOLMandate, available at http://www.monuc.org/Civpol/.
164. SeeMONUC CIVPOL Strength and Structure, available at http://www.monuc.org/Civpol/Strength.aspx.
165. CIAWorld Fact Book, SeeMONUC CIVPOL Strength and Structure note 128. That works out to approximately one police officer per 12,000 sq. km.
166. SeeUNSCOR 1493 (2003) (authorizingMONUC to ‘take all necessarymeasures’ to ‘contribute to the security conditions').
167. See ‘DRC: MONUC Investigators Attacked in Ituri’, The East African, 5 February 2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200402050162.html (reporting a 5 February attack by unidentified gunmen on UN investigators). Notably, even with its enhanced authority MONUC failed to repel a recent rebel advance on the city of Bukavu. See ‘UN Troops Open Fire in Kinshasa’, BBC News, 3 June 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3773629.stm.
168. See, e.g., Akhavan, ‘DRC: MONUC Investigators Attacked in Ituri’ note 42, at 7.
169. The methodological problems with such a claim are myriad. First, only a very few interview subjects are available as many perpetrators are inaccessible or refuse to talk to outsiders. Moreover, interviewees have a strong incentive to alter their responses given the potential prosecutions that many ensue, despite the non-judicial nature of such interviews. Finally, the potential causal variables of a reduction in crime are numerous-economic improvement, a new peace process, better policing, lower crime reporting, etc.With the availabledata, it is impossible toisolate a causal variable orevenprovide statisticallymeaningfulevidence as to whether the ICC has had a direct effect. It is nonetheless interesting and arguably useful to observe the correlation between decreasing crime rates and statements by perpetrators that the ICC has been causal of their behaviour change.
170. ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2004 Economist Intelligence Unit Report, at 14.
171. Formore information on the Congolese Patriotic Union (UPC) see the group's website: www.upc-rp.info.
172. See http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4735034-110490,00.html, 17 August 2003. See also http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3025031.stm, 12May 2003.
173. ‘Another Key Ituri Leader Arrested’, Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22March 2005.
174. Personal Interview, Thomas Lubanga, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 26 October 2003.
175. Thomas Lubanga, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 26 October 2003.
176. Thomas Lubanga, Personal Interview, 26 October 2003, Kinshasa, DR Congo.
177. SeeDaily Press Briefing by theOffice of the Spokesman for the SecretaryGeneral, 10 February 2003, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2004/db021004.doc.htm.
178. For a discussion of this death sentence, see Democratic Republic of Congo News: 28 February 2003, available at http://www.genocidewathc.org/congofebruary282003.htm.
179. See T. Tshibangu, ‘Monitoring DRC’, MONUC Briefing, 9 February 2004, available at http://www.monuc.org/ News.aspx?newsID=1880; see also ‘Xavier Chiribanya ou le sommet visible de l'iceberg, nkoko-mboka.com-hebo’, 10 February 2004, available at http://www.nkolo-mboaka.com/Xavier-CHIRIBANYA-02.html. Thiswas the same residence a which the interview was conducted.
180. Xavier Ciribanya, Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 30 October 2003.
181. See Tshibangu, Xavier Ciribanya note 189.
182. Victor Yenyi Olungu, Premier Avocat Gé né ral de la Ré publique, Personal Interview, Kinshasa DR Congo, 30 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, Adrian Alvarez and LeslieMedema).
183. A. Deutch, ‘Congolese Human RightsMinister: New Criminal Court Deters TribalWarfare’, The Associated Press, 22 January 2004, available at http://www.ictj.org/news.asp.
184. Raphael Wakenge, InitiativeCongolaise du Justice et Paix, Personal Interview, Bukavu,DRCongo, 30October 2003.
185. Roberto Ricci, MONUC, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 28 October 2003 (interview conducted by Adrian Alvarez, Yuriko Kuga and LeslieMedema).Notably, not allMONUC officials interviewed agreed with this position. Some suggested that ‘many warlords don't know about [the ICC] yet. Only folks in Bunia do’. Personal Interview, Bukavu, DR Congo, 29 October 2003.
186. William Lacy Swing, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Personal Interview, Kinshasa, DR Congo, 31 October 2003 (interview conducted by Yuriko Kuga, LeslieMedema and Adrian Alvarez)
187. This process involves both changes to rational interest calculation and identity perceptions. For a discussion of the latter in the context of the transnational legal process, seeH.Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Rev. 181.
188. 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Preamble.