Effet de la structure des droits de vote sur la qualité des mécanismes internes de gouvernance: Cas des entreprises canadiennes

Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 183-201

  Boujenoul, Ameur ^a   Zeghal, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Quality of corporate governance; Voting rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845870920     PISSN: 08250383     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1936-4490.2006.tb00626.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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