Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection

European Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 281-304

  Hellmann, Thomas ^a   Stiglitz, Joseph ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Credit market; Equity market; Rationing equilibrium

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; FINANCIAL MARKET; MARKET CONDITIONS;

EID: 0033961523     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00076-2     Document Type: Article

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