Imitation and long run outcomes

Topics in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 121-156

  Dutta, Jayasri ^a   Prasad, Kislaya ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary Games; Imitation; Long Run Outcomes

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444301592     PISSN: 1534598X     EISSN: 1534598X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1163     Document Type: Article

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