Contests with an unknown number of contestants

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 353-368

  Münster, Johannes ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contest; Number uncertainty; Rent seeking; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751109502     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9035-y     Document Type: Article

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