Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 119-130

  Clark, Derek J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031501751     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004956326435     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Clark, D.J. and Riis, C. (1996). On the win probability in rent-seeking games. University of Tromsø Discussion Paper in Economics No. E4/96.
2. Johnson, P.E. (1990). Asymmetries in political entry. European Journal of Political Economy 6: 377-396.
3. Leininger, W. (1993). More efficient rent-seeking - A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75: 43-62.
4. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
5. Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments.American Economic Review 76: 701-715.
6. Snyder, J.M. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica 57: 637-660.
7. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: Texas A&M Press.